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Abstract
Chile is often cited as a target example for other countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe because of its
success in economic restructuring, market liberalization, and stabilization. Deemed the “economic jaguar,”
Chile has undergone substantial economic, social, and political transitions over the past decade. However,
several problems still need to be addressed before Chile attains developed economic status.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Chile is often cited as a target example for
other countries in Latin America and Eastern Eu-
rope because of its success in economic restructur-
ing, market liberalization, and stabilization.
Deemed the “economic jaguar,” Chile has under-
gone substantial economic, social, and political tran-
sitions over the past decade. Moving closer to the
spectrum of developed countries, Chile continues
to show productivity gains, high output growth, in-
creased trade, decreased unemployment, and im-
proved education as well as other indicators of posi-
tive development.  However, several problems still
need to be addressed before Chile attains developed
economic status.  These problems include poor in-
come distribution and overpopulated metropolitan
areas and their associated social and economic im-
plications.
II.  ECONOMY
Chile’s economy enjoyed a remarkable
boom in the early 1990s- the result of a comprehen-
sive transformation that began in 1974 with the
adoption of free-market economic policies.  There
was an overall increase in the output produced by
all the sectors in the Chilean economy between 1973
and the present date.  In 1998, the agricultural sec-
tor amounted to only 8.4 percent of the national
GDP, which represents the world average and is less
than half the average of the middle income econo-
mies.  The industry and manufacturing sectors were
very developed, accumulating 34.2% and 16.4%
of the GDP, respectively.  These averages are simi-
lar to those of high-income economies with Chile’s
industry sector being 2 percentage points higher.
The service sector accounts for 57.4 percent of the
GDP, while the average for high income nations is
61 %, and that of the middle and low income econo-
mies surrounds 39 % (World Development Report,
1998/99).  These changes in the structure of the
Chilean economy resulted in a huge influx of people
in the urban sector and a shift of income distribu-
tion in favor of those in the city.  As the economy is
expected to continue growing at a rate of 5% (ac-
cording to the to World Bank), this issue will be-
come more pressing for the Chilean government.
1.  Unemployment
Overpopulation in cities can often lead to
high unemployment due to shortages of jobs avail-
able to meet the demand of the urban labor force.
The average unemployment rate for Chile between
1980 and 1997 was 12.2%.  This measurement,
however, does not depict the fluctuations in unem-
ployment over this time span.  The unemployment
rate in the early 1980s was high at 14.3% due to
financial and economic troubles.  The economy had
entered into a recovery oriented toward production
of non-tradable goods.  This could not keep pace
with the international debt that was accumulating
and therefore resulted in high unemployment.  In
1982, the economy switched gears and reoriented
production to tradable goods and services.  Along
with these changes unemployment rates lowered and
continued to drop in the next decade.  The unem-
ployment rate decreased to 8.1% in the late 1980s
and 5.0% in the early 1990s.  Likewise, the rate of
growth in employment for the 1987-91 period was
3% per year.  The rate was even higher from 1987
to 1989 (5%) after the quick recovery from the eco-
nomic crisis of 1982-83 (Library of Congress).
In 1991 workers’ wages increased substan-
tially and almost recovered to their 1970 average
levels.  Possible explanations for this include Chile’s
return to democracy, which allowed workers to ex-
ercise their rights more freely, and labor market
conditions that were closer to full employment.
Chile’s emphasis on the development of employ-
Chile:
The Success Story of a Developing Country
By Emily Griffen, Esteban G. Lizano
Kathy-Ann Moe, Marta Siaba,
and Michelle Stone
The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII72
The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII 73
ment-intensive industries caused the unemployment
rate to drop in the early 1990s.  Between May, 1996,
and July, 1997, 124,000 jobs were created, mostly
in the areas of construction, business, and industry.
Along with increasing economic growth,
Chile’s government works to improve social equal-
ity.  According to a government survey, employ-
ment rose even more in the poorest sectors of the
population. This growth in jobs was also accompa-
nied by improvements in the quality of the jobs.
According to Walter Riesco, the President of the
Production and Commerce Confederation, growth
in the individual production sectors created jobs,
but growth is meaningless if the jobs are of low
quality.  He suggested a higher degree of education
and training so that the poorer members of Chile’s
population could begin to opt for higher quality jobs.
His suggestions resulted in education reforms in the
past years, but unemployment rates began to rise
regardless.  In June of 1999, the unemployment rate,
measured as a percent of the active population, was
10.8% due to a more skilled labor force and rising
inflation rates (Latin Focus, 1999).
2.  Trade Reform
Over the past 25 years, Chile has
transitioned from a closed, state-run economy into
a model of free trade and market-oriented capital-
ism.  Opening to trade was a major force in Chile’s
economic restructuring, and this continues to in-
crease in importance, with exports and imports
nearly tripling between 1972 and 1996, account-
ing for over 20% of GDP each (Hornbeck, 1998).
The main goods Chile imports are industrial based
products and come primarily from the European
Union, United States, Japan, and Brazil.  These
goods include petroleum, wheat, capital goods, spare
parts, motor vehicles, and raw materials.  Import
expenditures in 1993 were estimated to be at $10.1
billion US dollars.  The main goods that Chile ex-
ports are copper, industrial products, molybdenum,
iron ore, wood pulp, seafood, fruits, and nuts.  To-
tal export earnings in 1993 were estimated to be
$9.3 billion US dollars (World Development Re-
port, 1999).
J.F. Hornbeck, a specialist in International
Trade and Finance, asserted that, “Ultimately, for-
eign competition led to a reallocation of resources
to Chile’s more competitive industries, which
brought increased productivity and economic
growth” (1998 p. 7).  Because of its comparative
advantage in agriculture, Chile has shifted its trade
strategy from import substitution to export promo-
tion.  Chile has evolved from a state of tariffs as
high as 750% under Allende’s socialist government
to its current position at 11% (Hornbeck, 1998).
As a result of this strategy change, copper contin-
ues to account for almost half of the total value of
Chilean exports, with rapid growth seen in exports
of agricultural, fishing, and forestry goods.
By changing its emphasis to agricultural
exporting firms and away from those industrial firms
that benefit from import substitution, Chile may be
in a better position to improve income distribution
by promoting the production of poor, rural farmers.
In the long-run, however, this promotion of rural
goods may not be advantageous.  According to the
Prebisch-Singer thesis, the final demand for primary
commodities increases less relative to income.  Thus,
if Chile remains an exporter of primary goods, the
risk of reductions in export earnings, GDP, and in-
vestment emerges.  Also, this shift in policy may
simultaneously inhibit the development of its indus-
trial sector, as small, domestic industries find them-
selves unable to compete with international com-
petitors.
III.  EDUCATION
According to economists Francisco Ferreira
and Julie Litchfield, “Education may be the most
important variable affecting the structure of, and
changes in, inequality in Chile,” (1998).  The im-
portance of education is obvious in regard to the
economic development of a country.  In order to see
improvement and growth in an economy, attention
must be given to the quality of education in the coun-
try.  For developing countries such as Chile, focus
should be directed at the promotion of primary edu-
cation initially.  Basic education increases people’s
ability to learn and to interpret information.  A good
education also fosters agricultural innovation and
promotes the use of new technologies in all aspects
of life, including health, nutrition, and contracep-
tion.  One measure of the education level is the adult
Chile
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illiteracy rate, which is the percent of people 15 and
above that cannot read.  For Chile, the rates for both
male and female in 1995 was 5%.  This is astonish-
ingly very low compared to the average rates for
the world, which are 21% and 38% for males and
females, respectively.  Chile’s illiteracy rates are also
lower than the average for all upper middle income
countries.  These rates are 12% for males and 17%
for females.  In fact, Chile can almost be compared
to the high-income countries that roughly have il-
literacy rates less than 5% (World Development
Report, 1998/99).  The reason for such low illit-
eracy rates in Chile is due to the quality of educa-
tion available to the citizens of the country.  Al-
though the education programs in Chile are below
the standard of high-income countries, Chile fairs
better than other developing countries.
Chile’s government over the past several
years has implemented educational programs in ef-
forts to improve education and overall economic
position.  Public spending on education for the year
1996 was 923,943 million Chilean pesos represent-
ing 3.1% of the total public spending for the same
year.  In 1996 a five-year plan was implemented in
order to improve the level of education provision
throughout the country.  The plan, called the Edu-
cation Act, aims to narrow the gap between the
present inequality in education within the country.
In order to do this, teacher and in-service training is
being provided by World Bank along with monetary
funds.  There is also concentration on syllabus de-
velopment and the development of links with other
universities outside of Chile.
Another step that is being taken by the gov-
ernment to improve education in the counrty is to
lengthen the school day and calendar year.  All el-
ementary and secondary schools will move from a
six-hour schedule to an eight-hour schedule.  This
change, along with the extension of the school year
by two weeks, will increase the time spent in the
classroom by 200 hours a year per student.  Along
with the increased classroom time, Chile’s govern-
ment is also spending money on further training for
teachers at all levels.  Through all this, Chile hopes
to establish a solid educational program for its popu-
lation.
IV.  MEASUREMENTS OF POVERTY
Another measure of the development of a
country is the level of poverty.  The Head Count
Index provides an alternative assessment of poverty,
focusing on absolute numbers rather than the rela-
tive figures that result from income distribution
measurements.  This index uses poverty lines to
show what percentage of the population can be clas-
sified as living in poverty.  For the survey year 1992,
15% of Chile’s population was living under $1 a
day, whereas 38.5% was living under $2 a day.
Another measure of welfare is the poverty
gap, which assesses the severity of poverty in a coun-
try by measuring the share of resources needed to
raise the poor above the poverty line.  The poverty
gaps of 4.9% and 16% for the $1 and $2 day pov-
erty lines, respectively, are significantly smaller than
those of other developing countries (World Devel-
opment Report, 1998/99).  Although it is difficult
to make cross-country comparisons due to reasons
such as insufficient and untimely data, Chile’s pov-
erty, as measured by the Head Count Index and
poverty gap, appears to be much lower than other
developing countries.  This is possibly due to Chile’s
economy having more natural resources and a very
developed industrial sector, which makes its citi-
zens better off than other developing countries.
Although these measurement show that Chile is fair-
ing better then other developing countries, they fail
to capture how income is distributed among citi-
zens earning different income levels.  Regardless of
the poverty measured used, it is obvious that a dis-
parity between income levels in Chile exists.  This
problem will be addressed more fully in a subse-
quent section of this analysis.
V.  THE PROBLEM OF URBANIZATION
As Todaro points out in “Urbanization and
Rural-Urban Migration: Theory and Policy,” the
urban growth rate in less-developed countries has
grown exponentially. By the year 2000, there will
be an added 1.32 billion urban citizens in Third
World regions (Todaro, 1997).  Chile is not exempt
to this prediction by any means.  By 1991, the ur-
ban population was 86 % of the total population.
The most prominent example of this urban growth
is in Santiago, Chile.  Urban growth that began in
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the middle of the twentieth century multiplied in
the second half of the century with advancements
in transportation and communications.  The major-
ity of this growth occurred in the lowest classes.
Rural Chileans and some migrants found Santiago
especially attractive for many reasons.  Although
there are positive externalities that arise in adding
to the urban population, such as an expanded labor
pool and economies of scale, Santiago is an excel-
lent example of how these possible benefits are
dwarfed by the economic and social costs of intense
urban population growth.
The main problems with urban growth in
Santiago stem from the fact that it has absorbed
about 39% of the Chilean population, according to
the 1992 census figures.  Santiago grows at a rate
of about 30% to 50% every 10 to 12 years (Library
of Congress, Urbanization).  Although a portion of
this can be accounted for by the wealthy upper class
from other parts of Chile who reside in the Andes
foothills of the city, the majority of migrants are the
extreme poor.  The migration of large numbers of
poor Chileans creates the first economic cost with
which Santiago as a city and Chile as a whole must
deal: need for low-income housing.
According to 1990 estimates, there was a
need for one million more housing units that were
affordable to low-income persons in order to allevi-
ate the problem.  The financing of this endeavor by
municipal authorities presented a high economic
cost to the Chilean government.  Moreover, when
these housing units are built, the government must
also finance the provision of running water, elec-
tricity, garbage collection, and sewerage.  In the past,
the government has successfully incurred the cost
of providing many poorer areas with access to all
these necessities.  For example, by 1987, “98% of
the population in towns and cities had running wa-
ter, 98% had garbage collection, and 79% had sewer
systems” (Library of Congress, Urban Areas).  These
statistics are impressive and are also indicative to
the fact that the Chilean government is willing to
act on the needs of the poor to their best ability.  If
and when these new housing units are provided, the
government will, yet again, be required to provide
running water, garbage collection, sewer systems,
and electricity to these areas as well.
The Chilean government is faced not only
with the dire need of low-income housing for the
poor, but also with the need of reducing the poverty
of all those in need of that type of housing.  High
economic costs are associated with the financing of
low-income housing units that hold at the minimum
four people each.  There are also high economic
costs for social health and well-being programs for
the poor.  The Chilean government has attempted
to fill this through an extensive system of state run
welfare programs, including social security, health,
and education.  From the mid-1970s to the early
1990s, welfare spending ranged from as little as 19%
to as much as 26% of the gross domestic product
(Library of Congress, Welfare Institutions and So-
cial Programs).
Evidently, the Chilean government faces
daunting economic costs due to the intense urban-
ization of Santiago.  There is a dire need for hous-
ing as well as for social programs to aid the poor.
Examples of these programs are universal access to
health care which focuses on programs of preven-
tive care for all expectant mothers, infants, and chil-
dren.  Also, the government financed the state-run
educational system, which was open to every child
at primary and secondary levels.  Moreover, Chile
offered low-income housing to the poor at heavily
subsidized rates. Due to the decline in the mortality
rate and a constantly increasing poor population,
spending for these various programs increasingly
outpaced revenues.
Looking at a more specific portion of the
urban population, the focus will shift from the ge-
neric urban Chilean laborer to the informal sector
worker.  Moreover, the following will also illustrate
how the government attempted to encourage the
poor to improve their income status, thus making
them less dependent on the social welfare programs.
Todaro asserts that all migrants to urban areas are
not absorbed into the workforce and that an exten-
sive informal sector of the economy is created
(1997).  Santiago exhibits this characteristic.  In
the past, the Chilean government has heeded
Todaro’s advice that the “informal sector [has the]
ability to generate employment and income” (1997
p. 271).  The informal sector was seen as having
“income-producing” potential.  The government
Chile
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attempted to organize it by licensing stalls on side-
walks.  Not coincidentally, the demand for these
stalls exceeded the rate at which they could be fi-
nanced by the government.  Obviously, the
government’s ability to finance and organize this
aspect of the informal sector was less than the infor-
mal sector’s demand for this service.
Another cost that the informal sector cre-
ated in Santiago was through its Public Employ-
ment Program.  The “Programa de Empleo Minimo
(PEM)” paid a small salary to unemployed work-
ers who performed menial public works’ tasks.  In
May, 1982, there were 23,000 Chileans involved
in the PEM.  By May, 1983, there were 93,000
Chileans involved.  As the number of PEM employ-
ees increased, so did the cost to the government.
Programs like the PEM are in high demand during
times of recession or when the whole country is in
the most need.  Ironically, this is the time when the
government can least afford it.
In the past, it is evident that the Chilean
government has pursued many costly programs to
lessen the problems associated with urbanization.
All of the aforementioned programs eased some of
the social strife of Santiago’s poor.  However, the
Chilean government’s most pressing problem be-
yond the immediate welfare of its citizens is a so-
cial cost external to the costs of poverty itself.  The
intense crowding in Santiago and, to a lesser ex-
tent, other urban cities has created a pollution prob-
lem.  Santiago’s air pollution and the ocean pollu-
tion along the coastal regions are issues that need to
be addressed by the government (Library of Con-
gress, The Future of the Economy).  Earlier, the dif-
ficulty of financing the poor’s need for housing and
social programs was highlighted.  The government
had to divert revenue from other areas of the
economy in order to pay for such costly programs.
Therefore, the likelihood of alleviating the most
prevalent social cost of urbanization, pollution, is
very small.
Santiago is under duress due to massive in-
fluxes of Chileans.  The entire country seems to be
in a mode of movement.  For example, 8.6% of the
population had come to their current place of resi-
dence only in the past five years.  Santiago has ab-
sorbed the vast majority of this movement, and the
government has had to deal with both economic and
social problems associated with this skyrocketing
urban growth rate.  In doing so, it has had the added
pressure of these costs on top of the economic dis-
advantage associated with less developed countries.
VI.  POLICIES TO CORRECT URBANIZA-
TION PROBLEMS
Chilean policymakers have a disadvantage
due to the geography of the country.  The process of
urbanization takes a large toll on the country which
is only 300 miles across.  A large majority of the
population currently lives in cities of 200,000 or
more.  Policies that promote the agricultural sector
are the first step to reducing the urbanization prob-
lem.  Examples of such policies are the use of high
yield seeds, investment in human intensive produc-
tion, and continued promotion of agricultural ex-
ports.  These types of policies will increase the de-
mand for labor which will in turn, increase the agri-
cultural wage and employment.  Chileans will see
opportunities in the urban sector as less attractive.
There will be an increase in rural population, or at
least a decrease in rural to urban migration.  As a
result, urban unemployment will decrease; however,
urban wages will be unaffected in this traditional
sector enrichment.  Although these policies are suc-
cessful in theory, there are a few problems that must
be addressed in order to make this proposal realis-
tic.  First, the use of high yield seeds as a means to
improve the rural sector can fail for the following
reasons: farmers lack resources for fertilizers and
technology necessary, such as irrigation; farmers
lack access to affordable credit to sustain them
through seasonal variations in income; farmers lack
the ability to transport yield to the market due to
lack of reliable roads and vehicles.  In order to make
the use of high yield seeds effective, there must be
resources to circumvent the aforementioned prob-
lems.  If the government were to assume responsi-
bility in financing these infrastructure improve-
ments, it could use a progressive tax or a tax on
luxury items.  A portion of the revenue from these
taxes must be invested into the rural sector to make
the necessary improvements.
Problems with promoting labor intensive
methods of production are varied.  Industries might
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need to switch from capital to labor intensive pro-
duction processes.  These industries must also be
solely promoted in the rural sector.  If labor inten-
sive production begins developing in the urban sec-
tor, more rural Chileans will migrate.  Therefore, it
is imperative that this policy is centered in the rural
sector only.
Finally, a program that continues and ex-
pands agriculture export promotion will be highly
advisable and successful, but only to a point.  As
the Prebisch-Singer theory asserts, due to the low
income elasticity of agricultural products, profits
from these primary exports will reduce over time.
Therefore, the agricultural export promotion pro-
gram is a stepping stone for export promotion of
final goods, which will allow for continually increas-
ing profits.
VII.  THE IN-
COME DIS-
T R I B U T I O N
PROBLEM
I n c o m e
distribution is a
measure that as-
signs a certain
percentage of the
population (usu-
ally tenths or
quintiles) the per-
centage of income
consumed or
earned by that
segment.  Econo-
mists use this dis-
tribution to measure the extent to which income is
distributed among the population. Data available
from the World Bank Development Report for 1994
shows that income in Chile is very poorly distrib-
uted.  The lowest 20% of the population holds only
3.5% of national income, while the highest 20%
possesses 61%.  The distribution in this top quintile
is skewed towards the top as well, with the top 10%
claiming 46.1% of total income.
 The Gini coefficient is another measure of
income inequality used by economists.  The Gini
coefficient for countries with highly unequal income
distributions usually is between 50 and 70, while
for countries with relatively equitable distributions,
it falls around 20 to 35.  Chile has a Gini coeffi-
cient of 56.5, which is the eighth highest of all coun-
tries included in the report and also classifies it as
being highly unequal in income distribution.  In
comparison, we contrasted these statistics with two
countries with roughly the same population (the
Netherlands as a developed country, and
Kazakhstan, a developing country).  The Nether-
lands shows a much better distribution of income,
with a Gini coefficient of only 31.5.  The lowest
quintile has 8% of the income, while the richest one
holds only 39.9%.  Kazakhstan, a former soviet re-
public, also shows better distribution of income.
While the poorest 20% holds 7.5% of the national
income, the highest quintile accounts for 40.4% of
the wealth, setting
the stage for a Gini
coefficient of 32.7.
Since the Gini in-
dex “measures the
extent to which the
distribution of in-
come (or in some
cases consumption
e x p e n d i t u r e )
among individuals
or households
within an
economy deviates
from a perfectly
equal distribu-
tion,” the higher
value presented by Chile in respect to the other coun-
tries indicates a poorer distribution of income within
Chilean borders (World Development Report, 1999
p. 236).
Latin America has traditionally had one of
the most unequal income distributions in the world.
Chile has not been an exception to this rule.  It has
been estimated that in 1985 about 25% of house-
holds lived in extreme poverty, and that 45% of
households lived below the poverty line.  During
the 1990-1993 period, the incidence of poverty de-
clined substantially.  In late 1993, the Ministry of
Planning and Cooperation estimated that between
xednIiniG 5.65
%01tsewoL 4.1
%02tsewoL 5.3
%02dnoceS 6.6
%02drihT 9.01
%02htruoF 1.81
%02tsehgiH 0.16
%01tsehgiH 1.64
Table 1: Percentage Share of Consumption or Income
Source: 1999 World Bank Indicators
Chile
The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII78
1990 and 1993 more than 1.3 million people moved
out of poverty. This was the result of a combination
of social programs, such as the distribution of food
through the preschool nutritional program, aimed
at the poorest groups in society.  Table 1 shows the
distribution of income in Chile as of 1994, along
with its Gini coefficient.
        The distribution of personal income is quite
regressive in Chile in general, and Santiago in par-
ticular.  There is evidence that suggests that during
the years of mili-
tary rule income
inequality in-
creased signifi-
cantly.  The per-
sonal income in
Santiago is very
high, and it en-
joys about 40%
of the total in-
come.  Despite
changes in the
C h i l e a n
economy during
the military pe-
riod, the distri-
bution of per-
sonal income re-
mains rather
stable, even
though a some-
what greater
concentration
can be seen in
1989 than in
previous years
(see Table 2). The new policies on income and taxes
of the Aylwin government were expected to slightly
reverse this trend.
        The distribution of consumption by household
in Santiago showed a strong tendency toward the
concentration of expenditures in the higher-income
groups during the military government.  The fig-
ures for the first two years of the Aylwin govern-
ment show a small change in the direction toward a
more equitable distribution of consumption, al-
though it is still significantly more concentrated in
the richest quintile than in 1969 (see Table 3).  The
data shows that the richest quintile of households
increased its consumption steadily from 1969 to
1989 but declined in 1990 and 1991.  Moreover,
by 1991 the bottom two quintiles had increased their
share of consumption slightly at the expense of the
fourth quintile.  Hence, the distribution of house-
hold consumption was slightly more equal in 1991
than in 1988.
        These results must be interpreted with caution.
The distribution
of household in-
comes is af-
fected by the av-
erage number of
income earners
by household
income levels,
and in times of
economic crisis
the poorer seg-
ments may be
forced to rely on
the income of
fewer house-
hold members.
This apparently
happened in
Chile in 1983,
when there were
only 1.1 income
earners in the
poorest 20% of
families; in the
30% of house-
holds in the
middle- to lower-middle incomes, there were 1.4
income earners; in the 30% of households in the
middle- to high-income group, there were 1.7 in-
come earners; and in the 20% percent, there were
two income earners per household.  Because their
incomes were also higher, the concentration of con-
sumption in the high-income families was magni-
fied.  Similarly, the expansion of secondary school
enrollment during the 1980s benefited the children
of poorer households, but it may have deprived them
of income derived from youth employment.
Source: Based on information from Programa Economía del Trabajo, Serie
de indicadores económico sociales: Series anuales, Santiago, 1990, 68.
eliceD 9691 9791 9891
1 3.1 4.1 2.1
2 7.3 8.3 5.3
3 0.7 0.7 6.6
4 3.11 1.11 6.01
5 7.61 1.61 7.51
6 4.32 6.22 0.22
7 0.23 0.13 0.03
8 6.34 8.24 0.14
9 0.16 9.06 4.85
01 0.001 0.001 0.001
Table 2: Distribution of Personal Income by Decile in Metro-
politan Region of Santiago, 1969, 1979, and 1989
(in cumulative percentages)
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VIII.  CONCLUSION: POLICIES TO IM-
PROVE INCOME DISTRIBUTION
        The functional income distribution of an
economy translates into a size distribution through
knowledge of how ownership and control over pro-
ductive assets and labor skills are concentrated and
distributed throughout the population.  The distri-
bution of these asset holdings and skill endowments
ultimately determines the distribution of personal
income.  Modifying the size distribution through
progressive redistribution of asset ownership is one
policy that the Chilean government can undertake
to help lessen the inequality in income distribution.
        The ultimate cause of the unequal distribution
of personal incomes in most Third World countries
is the unequal
and highly
concentrated
patterns of as-
set ownership
in these coun-
tries. The prin-
cipal reason
why less than
20% of their
population re-
ceives over
50% of the na-
tional income
is that this
20% owns and
controls well
over 80% of
the productive
resources, es-
pecially physi-
cal capital and
land, but also
human capital in the form of better education.
        The more important line of policy to reduce
poverty and inequality is to focus directly on reduc-
ing the concentrated control of assets through the
unequal access to educational and income-earning
opportunities that characterize many developing
countries.  A classic case of such redistribution poli-
cies as they relate to the rural poor, who comprise
70% to 80% of the target poverty group, is land
reform.  The basic purpose of land reform is to trans-
form tenant cultivators into small landholders who
will then have an incentive to raise production and
improve their incomes.  However, land reform may
be a weak instrument of income distribution if other
institutional and price distortions in the economic
system prevent small farm holders from securing
access to much needed critical inputs such as credit,
fertilizers, seeds, marketing facilities, and agricul-
tural education.
        Human capital in the form of education and
skills is another example of the unequal distribu-
tion of productive asset ownership.  Public policy
should therefore promote wider access to educa-
tional opportunities as a means of increasing the in-
come-earning
potential for
more people.
However, as
in the case of
land reform,
the mere pro-
vision of
greater access
to education is
no guarantee
that the poor
will be any
better off, un-
less comple-
mentary poli-
cies are
adopted to
capitalize on
this increased
human capi-
tal.
        Reduc-
ing the size distribution at the upper levels through
progressive taxation of personal income and wealth
is another possible policy that can be undertaken.
Such taxation increases government revenues and
converts a market- and asset-determined level of
personal income into a fiscally corrected “dispos-
able” personal income.  Any national policy attempt-
ing to improve the living standards of the bottom
40% must secure sufficient financial resources to
Source: Based on information from Joaquín Vial, Andrea Butelmann, and Carmen
eledón Cariola, “Fundamentos de las políticas macroeconómicas del gobierno
democrático chileno (1990-1993),” Colección Estudios de CIEPLAN [Santiago],
No. 30, December 1990, 60; and La Nación [Santiago], December 27, 1992, 15.
elitniuQ 8691 8791 8891 9891 0991 1991
1 7.7 2.5 4.4 6.4 9.4 5.5
2 8.11 3.9 2.8 0.8 4.8 2.9
3 6.51 6.31 7.21 3.11 5.11 4.21
4 6.02 0.12 1.02 6.61 2.71 2.81
5 5.44 0.15 6.45 5.95 0.85 7.45
Table 3:  Distribution of Household Consumption by Quintile in
Metropolitan Region of Santiago, Selected Years, 1969-91
 (In percentages)
Chile
The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII80
transform paper plans into program realities
(Todaro, 1997).
The major source of such development is
the direct and progressive income taxation of both
income and wealth.  In either case, the burden of
the tax is designed to fall most heavily on the up-
per-income groups.  Unfortunately, in many devel-
oping countries, the gap between what is supposed
to be a progressive tax structure and what different
income groups actually pay can be substantial.  Pro-
gressive tax structures on paper often turn out to be
regressive in practice in that lower- and middle-in-
come groups pay a proportionately larger share of
their incomes in taxes than the upper-income groups.
This is because the poor are often taxed at the source
of their incomes or expenditures.  By contrast, the
rich derive by far the largest part of their incomes
from the return on physical and financial assets,
which often go unreported (Todaro, 1997). Policies
to enforce progressive rates of direct taxation on
income and wealth, especially at the highest levels,
are what are most needed in this area of redistribu-
tion.  The government should also consider taxing
luxury items that are imported into the country, as
only the wealthy can afford these items.
        Another alternative available to the govern-
ment is the moderating of the size distribution at
the lower levels through public expenditures of tax
revenues to raise the incomes of the poor either di-
rectly or indirectly.  Such public policies raise the
real income levels of the poor above their market-
determined personal income levels.  The direct pro-
vision of tax-financed public-consumption goods
and services, such as public health projects in rural
areas, school lunches, and the provision of clean wa-
ter and electrification to remote areas can help eradi-
cate poverty. All these policies have the effect of
raising the real personal income levels of the Poor
beyond their actual market-derived, monetary in-
comes.  Unfortunately, in the 1980s and early 1990s,
with the Third World Debt crisis and the implemen-
tation of World Bank and IMF-induced structural
adjustment programs, the first victims of mandated
public expenditure retrenchments were the rural and
urban poor, especially women (Todaro, 1997).  That
is, the poor were made even worse off by the cut-
backs in government expenditure.
        As with all policies, the Chilean government
needs to carefully weigh all the options, and make
sure that the negative aspects do not outweigh the
benefits.  In order for the policies to be successful,
they need to positively impact the people that they
are supposed to be helping.  Chile has shown tre-
mendous progress in its economic reform.  How-
ever, several issues, specifically urbanization and
income distribution, still remain problematic.  The
Chilean government should continue to attack these
areas, but should also be cautious of potential sec-
ondary consequences of the policies implemented.
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